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LANDLORDS, BANKRUPTCY, AND 77B
MARTIN A. ROEDER
So much attention has been paid to the power of the Supreme Court to
pass on the constitutionality of Congressional legislation, that little interest
has been shown in its other activities-some of which have been epoch-
making. An example of this is found in the decisions rendered on January
4th, 1937, which brought to a close one phase of protracted litigation
engendered by the United Cigar Stores' reorganization.
The United Cigar Stores Company of America, incorporated in 1912, has
conducted retail cigar and drug store chains which have grown to huge
proportions. These chains served as a basic structure supporting an extensive
advertising business and a real estate venture of considerable magnitude.
The philosophy of chain store management in boom times prescribed volume
of sales rather than dollar profit on sales. Mark-up on sales was required to
be sufficient to pay overhead, but low enough to kill competition. The
actual profits of the organization were realized from its unique position in
the field of distribution. Display advertising revenues and rebates from
manufacturers, both of which depended on the amount of volume achieved,
were tremendous sources of income which helped swell the chain's profits.
This struggle for volume of, rather than profit on, sales created a situation
where the chain store would snatch up an advantageous leasehold regard-
less of price. They had tremendous bargaining power, could bid for the
best leases and seemed to have a monopoly, in the larger cities, of the choice
locations. This advantages, however, became, in times of depression, a source
of worry and trouble. Most overhead costs are more or less flexible; wages,
raw materials and other selling costs are keenly sensitive to the general eco-
nomic situation. Rent costs, however, are relatively inflexible. This is due,
to some extent, to the lack of foresight of most landlords who feel that the
signature of a huge corporation on a lease means permanency of tenure and
security in the return on their land. But to a large extent this inflexibility
is due to other conditions. Taxes on land, interest on mortgages, and
depreciation are not easily reduced.
Thus, rentals, which in boom times amounted to 5% of the total gross
sales of an organization, became, in a period of depression, 7% or 8%. Over
the course of time, the various retail chain stores had found that the ratio
of their rentals to gross sales had become standardized depending on the
necessity of occupying particularly valuable space. Grocery stores paid
about 2 %o of gross sales in rental, five and tens 5%, drug stores, candy
shops and tobacco stores 7 .%, restaurants 10%.
Total sales of the United Chain (in reorganization) for 1936 were $55,359,-
286. According to the ratio above, their rentals should have been $4,150,-
000. Had their old leases been extant, actual rentals would have been over
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$7,000,000. Thus it was that this huge chain of retail outlets found itself
floundering under the tremendous burden of fixed rental charges incurred
under long-term leases executed during the halcyon pre-crash days. Over a
thousand long-term leases' had been optimistically signed involving several
millions of dollars in annual rentals. Following the usual 'procedure,2 the
'See 58 FINANCIAL WORLD 367. Cf. also Representative Cellar's remarks about the
pending bankruptcy proceedings of the United Cigar Stores Co. in 76 CONG. REc., Pt. 2,
p. 1360. See also (1933) 42 YAr L. J. 1003; (1933) 33 CoR. L. R. 231; (1933) 7
UN V. OF CiNN. L. R. 164.
THE LEASE SITUATION IN THIRTY CHAINS (1932)
DRUG:
Drug Inc. (Liggett)
Peoples Drug Stores
Walgreen Company
GENERAL MERCHANDISE:
W. T. Grant
S. S. Kresge
S. H. Kress
McCrory Stores
McLellan Stores
J. J. Newberry
J. C. Penney
F. W. Woolworth
GROCERY:
American Stores
H. C. Bohack
Dominion Stores
First National Stores
Grand Union
Great A. &. P. Tea
Kroger Grocery & Baking
National Tea
Daniel Reeves
Safeway Stores
RESTAURANT:
Bickford's
Childs
Exchange Buffet
Loft
Shattuck
John R. Thompson
Waldorf. System
TOBACCO:
Schulte Retail Stores
United Cigar Stores
* Partially estimated.
** Information refused.
* Information not available.
No. Stores
Total No. Owned Under
of Stores In Fee Lease
550 6 544
117 2 115
471 1 470
438 12 426
722 217 505
221 110 111
241 ** **
274 12 *262
379 None All
1,464 None All
1,925 192 1,733
2,906 203 2,703
741 ***... ***...
563 None All
2,823 ***... ***
708 9 699
15,670 None All
4,797 22 4,775
1,462 ***... ***...
775 None All
3.406 50 3,356
76 None All
109 *50 *59
35 None All
145 1 144
47 7 40
116 ***... ***...
162 None All
296 *170 *126
1,190 None All
Average
Life of
Leases
(years)
10
7
*10
*15
*30
*25
*o
*40
10
2%
*2
2
4
21
*i11
10
*45
The percentage paid by the United Chain in 1936 was in line with these figures:
Cigar Stores 7.1% of total sales and Drug Stores 8.02%.
'The depression was marked by a series of such manoeuvres in the form of bankruptcy
proceedings. To mention but a few, F. & W. Grand-Silver Stores, Wallach Brothers,
Browning King, Sarnoff Irving and Truly Warner.
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corporation filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and was adjudged a
bankrupt on August 29, 1932. On June 9, 1934, two days after the passage
and effective date of § 77B, the Cigar Stores Company filed its petition for
reorganization thus taken advantage of the state's mechanism for avoiding
the high charges incurred in boom times.3
During the bankruptcy proceedings the trustee for the Company rejected
hundreds of leases as too burdensome to be continued. It has long been clear
that the trustee may do so. 4 A long and painful groan, which was soon heard
in the courts and before special masters, rose from the ranks of the landlords,
who were thus losing their star tenants. But to no avail; the courts were
firm that no claim lies against a bankrupt estate for rejection of an unexpired
lease." They refused to deviate from the old and tried rule.
Much excellent material has been written6 discussing the plight of the
landlord in this situation, and there would be little excuse for another article
unless the matter could be somewhat synthesized and the most recent cases,
reversing the former doctrine, analyzed. These tasks will be attempted here.
I
The problems presented must be analyzed by the application of the pre-
cedents of three different fields of law; that of bankruptcy, of equity receiver-
ship, and of landlord and tenent. The solution to the reorganization problem
is to be found only by fusing these doctrines in the flame of practical necessity
and legal coherence. Investment in land was one of the earliest forms of
capital investment, 7 and the favorite method of determining land value is by
capitalizing rentals. In the boom days there was thought to be no sounder
means of determining real estate value than by using as evidence the long-
term chain store leases; nor was there any surer way of guaranteeing safe in-
come to the landlord. But the depression and its epidemic of chain store
bankruptcies taught the too optimistic landlord that he was a much despised
creditor," for the courts have invariably held, in the absence of special statute,
'See Downtown Investment Assn. v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs., 81 F. (2d) 314,
323 (C. C. A. 1st 1936).
"In re Roth and Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2d 1910); Manhattan Properties,
Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320, 54 Sup. Ct. 385 (1934).
"Brown et al. v. Irving Trust Co., In re United Cigar Stores Co., 66 F. (2d) 473(C. C. A. 2d 1933) ; In re United Cigar Stores (Otis), 83 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d
1936); In re United Cigar Stores (City Bank Farmers Trust Co.) 83 F. (2d) 209
(C. C. A. 2d 1936).
'Too much praise cannot be given to the excellent discussions of various phases of
the subject in Rent Claims in Bankruptcy by Schwabacher and Weinstein, (1933) 33
COL. L. REv. 213; in Landlords' Claims in Reorganiaations by Douglas and Frank,(1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1003; in Claims for Unaccrued Rent in Bankruptcy by Max
Radin, (1933) 21 CALIF. L. REv. 561, 22 CALIF. L. REv. 1 and in Landlord's Claims
under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act by J. Mark Jacobson, (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 422.
721 CALIF. L. Rv. 561.
'This is surprising in view of the privileged position the landlord holds in continental
law. The French Code Civil § 1188 and Code de Commerce § 444 allow the landlord's
claim. In the German Konkursordnung, § 21 regulates claims for rent and §§ 65, 66 and
67 cause contingent claims to become due or allow the creditor security therefor.
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that a landlord could not file a claim for damages caused by his tenant's
bnkruptcy.9
In 1931, Maynard v. Elliott,9" had greatly encouraged landlords to believe
that their day had come at last. In that case the bankrupt had endorsed some
notes not yet matured when the bankruptcy petition was filed. No protest
had been made. The Supreme Court, reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals,
allowed the claim despite its contingency. The Court reasoned ,that the pur-
pose of the statute to free the bankrupt from debts necessitated this result.
Naturally, a decision like this, where the claim was totally contingent,
heartened landlords and made more likely an opinion reversing the former
trend of the rent cases which, to a large extent, as will be seen infra, had
rejected claims for future rent on the ground that they were contingent.
All such hopes, however, were frustrated by Manhattan Properties, Inc.
v. Irving Trust Co.'0  This was a typical case in which the plaintiff bad
leased to the bankrupt, the lease containing the usual indemnity clause pro-
viding that the landlord could reenter if the tenant becomes bankrupt, the
tenant to remain liable for rental losses. After bankruptcy, the plaintiff
reentered and then filed a claim for damages resulting from breach of the
lease. The opinion reluctantly expunged the plaintiff's claim and decided
that, although contingent claims were admissible under Maynard v. Elliott,
the case of In re Roth and Appel" was too firmly entrenched, in all but two
circuits, to be overruled.
The courts, deprived of the argument of contingency, reasoned along
historical lines to maintain the doctrine,'12 which was not confined to rent
claims by the landlord, but was extended to cover various similar situations.'3
Thus, claims by a solvent lessee on a rent guarantee made by the bankrupt,14
sums paid to the bankrupt for the assignment of the lease,15 sums which the
bankrupt contracted to pay in the future for assignment of a lease to it,x° and
sums paid out for repairs17 have been held unprovable in the bankruptcy
proceeding.
The resultant protest among landlords brought about the only remaining
solution to the problem-Congressional action. In June, 1934 § 63 (a) of
the Bankruptcy Act was amended so as to include claims for future rent,'8 and
'See note 6 supra and (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 213.11283 U. S. 273, 51 Sup. C. 390, 75 L. ed. 1028 (1931).
"Supra note 4.
"Supra note 4.
"See Wright v. Irving Trust Co., 70 F. (2d) 245 (C. C. A. 2d 1934).
'But see discussion of types of covenants held provable, infra.
"Marshall and Ilsley Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 70 F. (2d) 691 (C. C. A. 2d 1934).
"Cloudy Realty Corp. v. Irving Trust Co., 70 F. (2d) 263 (C. C. A. 2d 1934),
cert. den. 292 U. S. 653 (1934).
'Wright v. Irving Trust Co., mupra note 12.
"IF. W. Grand 5-10-25 Cent Stores, Inc., 69 F. (2d) 807 (C. C. A. 2d 1934). Cf.
In re Metropolitan Chain Stores, 66 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 2d 1933).
8L. 1898 c. 541, § 63 a (7) as amended by L. 1934 c. 424, § 4a, 48 STAT. 923, 11
U. S. C. A. 103 a (7) :
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§ 77B was enacted with a clause allowing such claims' 9 under certain cir-
cumstances.
It was clear from Congressional discussion that these amendments were
designed to make the landlord a creditor of the bankrupt within the terms of
the statute, and that he was to receive some measure of relief in reorganiza-
tion proceedings. H. R. 5884, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, which ultimately
became § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act was under consideration when the
decision in the Manhattan Properties case was handed down. "The situation
of owners of business properties leased to chain store organizations which had
resorted to voluntary bankruptcy largely as a lever to force revision of
leases was the subject of comment in and out of Congress."2
Litigation under these new statutes was immediate, but still the lower
courts refused to extend relief to the landlord in cases based on reentry,
21
although they did allow claims for damages arising out of rejection by the
trustee.2 2 The statutes, it was said, went merely to the remedy and allowed
proof of landlord's claims where the substantive state law created such a
claim. The common law, howevei, unchanged in most states, declared that
re-entry by the landlord destroys the landlord-tenant relationship2 and
extinguishes any claim for future rent, since the doctrine of anticipatory
breach will not be applied to a lease.24
The appeal from the denial of the claim of the City Bank Farmers' Trust
"Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are ...
(7) claims for damages respecting executory contracts including future rents whether
the bankrupt be an individual or a corporation, but the claim of a landlord for injury
resulting from the rejection by the trustee of an unexpired lease of real estate or for
damages or indemnity under a covenant contained in such lease shall in no event be
allowed in an amount exceeding the rent reserved by the lease, without acceleration, for
the year next succeeding the date of the surrender of the premises plus an amount equal
to the unpaid rent accrued up to said date."
"L 1898 c. 541 § 77B (b) (10) as added by L. 1934 c. 424 § 1, 48 STAT. 912, 11
U. S. C. A. § 207 (b) (10):
"In case an executory contract or unexpired lease of real estate shall be rejected
pursuant to direction of the judge given in a proceeding instituted under this section, *or
shall have been rejected by a trustee or receiver in bankruptcy or receiver in equity,
in a proceeding pending prior to the institution of a proceeding under this section any
person injured by such rejection shall, for all purposes of this section and of the
reorganization plan, its acceptance and confirmation, be deemed to be a creditor. The
claim of a landlord for injury resulting from the rejection of an unexpired lease of
real estate or for damages or indemnity under a covenant contained in such lease shall
be treated as a claim ranking on a parity with debts which would be provable under
section 103 (a) of this title, but shall be limited to an amount not to exceed the rent,
without acceleration, reserved by said lease for the three years next succeeding the
date of surrender of the premises to the landlord or the date of reentry of the landlord,
whichever first occurs, whether before or after the filing of the petition, plus unpaid
rent accrued up to such date of surrender or reentry."
"City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 433, 57 Sup. Ct. 292
(1937).
'See note 5 supra.
"In re United Cigar Stores (Picker) 86 F. (2d) 629 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
'Cornwell v. Sanford, 222 N. Y. 248, 118 N. E. 620 (1918) ; and see In re R.K.O.,
91 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A. 2d 1937).
'Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N. Y. 333, 162 N. E. 97 (1928).
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Co. in the United Cigar Stores reorganization, and some few variations on
this situation, led to the opinions handed down by the Supreme Court on
January 4th, 1937, which we can now proceed to analyze.
II
Of the four decisions only three are of interest; these are City Bank Farm-
ers' Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,25 Schwartz v. Irving Trust Co.,26 and
Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co."
In the City Bank case the plaintiff's assignor had leased a building 'in New
Jersey to the United Cigar Co. During the pendency of the lease, which con-
tained no indemnity clause, the lessee filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy.
The trustee, defendant therein, subsequently rejected the lease and the landlord
reentered, rebuilt, and relet the premises. In 1934 the bankrupt, as permitted
by subsection (p), filed its petition for reorganization in the pending bank-
ruptcy proceeding. In this latter proceeding the plaintiff proved its claim
for damages due to loss of the tenant. The claim was expunged below 28 as
under New Jersey common law the lease had been terminated when the
landlord reentered and reconstructed on the premises. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that § 77B (10) clearly makes these claims provable
despite reentry.
The Schwartz case is particularly interesting in that it shows the extreme
reluctance of the lower courts, despite recently enacted legislation, to over-
turn precedent and change the trend of the cases. In August of 1932 when
the United Cigar Stores Company was adjudicated a voluntary bankrupt, the
trustee desired in many cases to modify some of the existing leases. In order
to do so he presented appropriate forms of agreements to laridlords, many of
whom executed them. All of these agreements contained releases in para-
graph 5, whereby the claims of the landlords were extinguished. 29
In nine of the cases, however, a rider, substantially in the following form,
was included in the new lease:
"Nothing in this article 5 shall be deemed a waiver by the landlord of
the right to prove against the bankrupt's estate any provable claims to
which the bankruptcy court may adjudge the landlord is entitled, but this
shall not be deemed to render any claim a provable claim which is not
otherwise such or to relieve the landlord from the necessity of proving
and obtaining the allowance of any such claim or preclude the trustee
from contesting such proof or allowance".
Subsequent to the signing of these agreements, Section 77B of the Bank-
'Supra note 20.
'299 U. S. 456, 57 Sup. Ct. 303 (1937).
1'299 U. S. 445, 57 Sup. Ct. 298 (1937).
'In re United Cigar Stores, 83 F. (2d) 209 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
'See Meadows v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 464, 57 Sup. Ct. 307 (1937).
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ruptcy Act was enacted. The question was whether these riders were suffi-
cient to save to the landlord the rights given to him by this new legislation.
The special master, to whom the matter was referred, conceded that the riders
were intended to preserve claims for future rent, but thought them effective
to save only claims, the provability of which resulted from a favorable court
ruling, and that claims rendered provable by subsequent legislation were not
within the reservation. The District Court approved the master's report.
A majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals80 held that the agreements con-
stituted surrenders which, according to state law, terminated all rights of the
landlords against the tenants, and that no claim was provable under Section
77B unless it was a continuing or subsisting claim against the debtor, recog-
nized by the applicable substantive law of the state. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, having already held that surrender by the trustee, acceptance by the land-
lord, reentry, and the exercise of dominion over the demised premises by the
latter after rejection of the lease, did not deprive the landlord of a provable
claim in proceedings under Section 77B for injury due to rejection of his lease
or upon the covenant of indemnity found in the lease,31 ruled that unless a col-
lateral release of the tenant by the landlord existed, the landlord would have a
provable claim. In this case the rider which reserved "the right to prove against
the bankrupt's estate any provable claims to which the bankruptcy court may
adjudge the landlord is entitled", was adjudged by the court to be broad
enough to preserve claims made provable under Section 77B. The court
said that the language used was not so limited as to save only claims provable
as a result of judicial decision, but that it also extended to claims made prov-
able by legislation.3 2
The Kuehiwr3 case arose out of a similar state 6f facts. .The plaintiff's
claim was allowed in the lower court only to the extent of three years' full
rental, although the plaintiff's total damages were actually more than that.
Against the contention that a sum equal to three years' rental be allowed
on a parity with other claims and the remainder subordinate to such claims but
ahead of stockholders' interests, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding that
no constitutional or other objections prevented the statutory limitation of the
claim from operating. The rationale of this decision will be discussed later.
Thus, at last, a doctrine rooted in the legal concepts of the feudal period and
cuddled and pampered by the courts throughout periods of economic and politi-
cal expansion was extirpated from our law. American jurisprudence has been
brought to conform more closely to modern needs. English law had long since
'83 F. (2d) 202; 85 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
'Supra note 20.
"'And see In re United Cigar Stores, Appeal of Salisbury Inv. Co., 88 F. (2d) 621(C. C. A. 2d 1937).
'Supra note 27.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
recognized the necessity of allowing landlords' claims84 although originally
the English bankruptcy statutes specifically excluded them.85
The reasons for this harsh treatment of the landlord-creditor in bank-
ruptcy have been three-fold. Two branches of the law are inextricably inter-
woven here, and each has furnished its rationale for denying the landlord's
claim.
In the first place, it might seem that bankruptcy, being a statutory proceed-
ing, would do away with unsubstantial distinctions, the product of history and
the common law. But this was not true with regard to those differentiations
made by the early courts between personalty and realty. Coke's early words
about the "diversity betweene duties which touch the realty, and the meere
personalty"'88 have been responsible for the denial of landlords' claims in
numerous cases87 and have been cited with approval by the Supreme Court as
distinguishing rent claims from all others.88 It has been clearly demonstrated
already 9 that the Court mis-cited this quotation which, instead of pointing out
substantive differences, was only meant by Coke to refer to certain procedural
distinctions. Be that as it may, however, many courts have considered the
differentiation to be sound and of sufficient weight to deny the same treatment
to rent claims as given to other claims in bankruptcy.
Especially important was this type of argument after the decision of
Maynard v. Elliott, which totally destroyed the old arguments against admis-
sion of landlords' claims on the ground that they were contingent ;40 the only
arguments left were those based on historical .distinction, mere adherence to
precedent,41 or the speculative uncertainty of damage.
The second and perhaps more important reason for denying landlords'
claims in bankruptcy was that which found its source in the nature of the
bankruptcy proceeding. It is an old rule in bankruptcy that debts must
exist as of a certain date in order to be included in the proceeding and dis-
charged. 42 Thus where a claim arose against the bankrupt after the filing of
the petition it was neither provable nor dischargeable in the proceeding.48  It
was early held that most rent claims fell within this category.44 These were
832 and 33 VicT. c. 71 § 25 (1869) ; 46 and 47 Vicr. c. 52 §§ 37, 55 (1883).
17 GEo. 1, c. 31 (1720) and see (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 217, 218.
'Co. LIrT. p. 292, b §. 513.
'Wells v. 21st Street Realty Co., 12 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 6th 1926); In re
Service Appliance Co., 39 F. (2d) 632 (N. D. N. Y. 1930); In re McAllister Mohler
Co., 46 F. (2d) 91 (S. D. Ohio 1930); In re Goldberg, 52 F. (2d) 156 (S. D. N. Y.
1931) ; In re Schulte-United, 2 Fed. Supp. 285 (S. D. N. Y. 1932) ; In re Metropolitan
Chain Store, Inc., 66 F. (2d) 482 (C. C. A. 2d 1933).
'Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U. S. 581, 36 Sup. Ct. 412 (1915).
•22 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 11.
"See discussion infra and (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 1111, 1167.
"Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust, supra note 14.
482 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY §§ 774 et seq.
"
3Davis v. Ham, 3 Mass. 33 (1807); Wentworth v. Whittemore, 1 Mass. 471 (1805).
"Wood v. Partridge, 11 Mass. 488 (1814).
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the first 6ases in America and* most of the subsequent cases relied on this
doctrine to prevent the proof of landlords' claims.45 On the other hand, rent
accruing prior to the petition in bankruptcy 46 gives rise to provable claims.4 7
Despite the fact that even the very early cases regarded rent as a separate
covenant, payment of which was required regardless of the existence of the
demised premises, it was gradually asserted that rent was an incident of the
land, and accrued periodically while the tenant held the land.48 Bankruptcy,
therefore, since it did not deprive the tenant of his leasehold, in no way affected
the relationship of landlord and tenant. No claim could be made by the
landlord; no discharge could release the tenant's duty to pay rent. Rent al-
ready due when the bankruptcy occurred was concededly provable;49 rent
thereafter due, since it was contingent on the continued tenure of the tenant,
was not provable. Nor, in the absence of specific agreement, could the land-
lord retake his land on the tenant's default. His sole remedy was distraint
of the tenant's chattels and a separate suit for rent.50
In order to avoid the results outlined above, most leases contained a coven-
ant of reentry and indemnity whereby, in case of failure to pay rent, or, some-
times, in case of bankruptcy, the landlord could reenter and the tenant would,
nevertheless, indemnify him for loss. Such a clause had no effect on the proof
of landlords' claims in bankruptcy, for the claim was still held to be contingent
because, at the time of filing of the petition, it was not known whether the
landlord would reenter or not.5'
These rules had all been worked out and applied long before the doctrine
of bankruptcy as anticipatory breach of a contract was introduced. 52 The
formulation of this latter doctrine and its recognition by the United States
Supreme Court 53 should have led to a re-examination of the rent cases for it
seems clear that if bankruptcy is a repudiation of a contract excusing perform-
ance by the promisee and giving him an immediate cause of action, the land-
45See (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 219-221.
"In re Sherwoods, Inc., 210 Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 2d 1913) ; In re Chakos, 24 F. (2d)
483 (C. C. A. 7th 1928) ; see Schenck v. Lewis, 121 Misc. 370, 201 N. Y. Supp. 282,
aff'd 210 App. Div. 845 (1923).
"It was early thought that breach of a contract to lease or of the lease prior to
bankruptcy would likewise create a 1provable claim, but these doctrines have been over-
ruled. See In re Mullings Clothing Co., 238 Fed. 58 (C. C. A. 2d 1916) ; Re National
Credit Clothing Co., 66 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 7th 1933); Urban Properties Co. v.
Irving Trust Co., 74 F. (2d) 654 (C. C. A. 2d 1935); Miller v. Irving Trust Co.,
296 U. S. 256, 56 Sup. Ct. 189 (1935); see, however, In re United Cigar Stores, 89
F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d 1937) which seems to revive the doctrine in the Second Circuit.
aWood v. Partridge, supra note 44.
'Supra note 46.
5°De Lancey v. Ganong, 9 N. Y. 9 (1853).
"Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 8th 1905); Atkins v. Wilcox, 105
Fed. 595 (C. C. A. 5th 1900); In re Roth & Appel, .supra note 4; In re Hubbard,
57 F. (2) 213 (W. D. N. Y. 1932).
'See cases mipra note 51.
"Central Trust Company of Illinois v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, supra note 38. See
In re United Cigar Stores, 89 F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 2d 1937).
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lord should have an immediate cause of action for breach of the rent covenant
in a lease. The objection of contingency disappears; the cause accrues with
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Unfortunately the Court did not wish
its doctrine to go that far. On page 590 of the opinion, rent claims are
expressly distinguished on the basis of Coke's words discussed above. The
subsequent decisions seized on this sentence of the Chicago Auditorium case
as a ground for denying proof of rent claims under the 1898 statute"4 as
claims arising from anticipatory breach of the lease through bankruptcy.
The state courts, likewise, refused to apply the doctrine of anticipatory
breach to leases. 5r This, of course, enabled those federal courts which felt
that they had to look to the state substantive law to determine whether the
landlord had a claim, to deny the existence of such a claim.
The third reason given by the courts for refusal of the landlords' claims is
that even if not barred on historical grounds, nor by the argument of con-
tingency, the claims nevertheless, are too speculative to be allowed in the
bankruptcy proceedings. 56 This phase of the problem is discussed in the
Kiehner case, 5T supra. The objection is easily dealt with; courts have under-
taken much more difficult problems of valuation. The value of an ear, a life,
are more difficult of estimation than that of a leasehold.5 8 Nor has the
court even hesitated to estimate the value of realty five years in the future.5 9
The original parties to the lease did not deem the task of setting a value for
the leasehold an impossible one the court should not hesitate. Difficulty of
decision should hardly be a bar to remedy. The better view is expressed in a
recent case which distinguishes between provability of claim and allowability.
The latter may be impossible because of the claimant's inability to set up a
basis for damages, but that does not defeat the provability of the claim.6 0
III
Thus, these doctrines, one born in the feudal law of a lost period and the
others out of administrative difficulties inherent in any liquidation process
had been responsible for the landlord's predicament. The decisions of the
"See note 37 supra.
'Hermitage Co. v. Levine, mspra note 24. And see Phoenix National Bank v. Water-
bury, 197 N. Y. 161, 166, 90 N. E. 435 (1910).
'In re Wise Shoes, Inc., 2 Fed. Supp. 521, aff'd 64 F. (2d) 1023, (C. C. A. 2d 1932);
In re Metropolitan Chain Stores (Malavazos v. Irving Trust) supra note 37; see Miller
v. Irving Trust, supra note 47; see Maynard v. Elliott, supra note 9a, and Manhattan
Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., mspra note 4.
'Supra note 27.
'See Cobb v. Overman, 109 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 4th 1901) life expectancy; Filene
Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597, 38 Sup. Ct. 211 (1917) leasehold; In re Schultz &
Guthrie, 235 Fed. 907 (D. C. Mass. 1917); cf. In re Portage Rubber Co., 296 Fed.
289 (C. C. A. 6th 1924); cf. New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil and T. Co., 34 F.
(2d) 653, 654 (C. C. A. 2d 1929).
'In re Marshall's Garage, 63 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 2d 1933).
'In re Wesley Corporation, 18 Fed. Supp. 347 (E. D. Ky. 1937); REMINGTON,
BANK UPTcY §§ 759, 904.
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courts, however, were closely followed by the ingenuity of lawyers and
various stipulations were incorporated into leases designed to protect the
landlord in case of the tenant's bankruptcy.
These devices must be studied here for it is an open question, under the
1934 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, whether they would not still be
effective to give the landlord something more than the one year's damages
or three years' damages allowed in bankruptcy and reorganization proceedings
respectively.6 1
The usual clause allowing reentry and indemnity on bankruptcy was
rendered nugatory in In re Roth and Appel.62  In order to avoid the ob-
jection of contingency set up in that case, some landlords learnt to use
the so-called "ipso-facto" clause,63 which provides that on filing the complaint
in bankruptcy against the tenant the lease is ipso facto terminated and dam-
ages accrued. This procedure, simple on its face, will be nullified by the courts
unless the utmost care is taken. Forfeiture or pefialty must be avoided,64
and the state law will be a factor in determining whether a penalty exists or
not.es It seems that the only formula is that used in the Perry case.66
Attempts to give the landlord both the remainder of the term and accrued
damages have been defeated not only as a penalty or forfeiture, but also
under the guise of judicial construction. 67
Landlords' claims based on breaches of covenants of the lease other than
rent covenants have frequently held to be provable in bankruptcy. This doc-
trine originated in In re Desnoyers Shoe Co.65 where a covenant to repair and
return machinery to the lessor was incorporated in a lease of the machinery
which was terminable on the lessee's bankruptcy at the will of the lessor. The
court uses a strained construction to get around the objection of contingency,
saying that when the lessor exercises his option the exercise relates back to
the time of bankruptcy.
"See In re United Cigar Stores Co., 89 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d 1937).
'Supra note 4.
'Irving Trust Co. v. Perry, 293 U. S. 307, 55 Sup. Ct. 150 (1934) ; see In re Pitts-
burgh Drug Co., 164 Fed. 482 (W. D. Pa. 1908); cf. Filene Sons Co. v. Weed, 245
U. S. 597, 38 Sup. Ct. 211 (1917) ; (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 667.
"Kothe v. Taylor Trust Co., 280 U. S. 224, 50 Sup. Ct. 142 (1930).
'In re Barnett, 12 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 2d 1926); In re Cushman, 3 F. (2d) 449
(S. D. N. Y. 1924); 884 West End Ave Corp. v. Pearlman, 201 App. Div. 12, 193
N. Y. Supp. 670, aff'd 234 N. Y. 589, 138 N. E. 458 (1922).
"Supra note 63 at page 310. ".... it is agreed as a further condition of this lease that
the filing of any petition in bankruptcy or insolvency by oi against the Lessee shall be
deemed to constitute a breach of this lease, and thereupon, ipso facto and without entry
or other action by the Lessor, this lease shall become and be terminated; and, not-
withstanding any other provisions of this lease, the Lessor shall forthwith upon such
termination be entitled to recover damages for such breach in an amount equal to
the amount of the rent reserved in this lease for the residue of the term hereof less
the fair rental value of the premises for the residue of said term."
"See also Murray Realty Co. v. Regal Shoe Co., 265 N. Y. 332, 193 N. E. 164 (1934)
In re Miller Bros. Grocery Co., 219 Fed. 851 (C. C. A. 6th 1915).
"227 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 7th 1915).
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Whatever we may think of the logic of this case, it was eagerly seized
upon as a precedent for allowing damages due to breach of collateral coven-
ants in leases to be proved in bankruptcy. 69 It is quite possible that by
judicious application of this doctrine a clever attorney may so draft a lease
as to disguise the rent payments as collateral payments and so avoid the limita-
tions on landlords' claims now incorporated into the Bankruptcy Act.70
IV
This review of the law leads to the necessity of a critical appraisal of the
situation, and a judgment of what parts of the old doctrines are still
relevant.
The first aspect to consider is what is the present standing of the Boyd
case.71 The doctrine of the Boyd case, that an unsecured creditor whose claim
was contingent at the time of an equity receivership, can reach the interest
remaining in the hands of the old stockholders when his claim matures, is an
outgrowth of the doctrine of fraudulent conveyances originating in the statute
of 13 Eliz. ch. 5 (1571). That the doctrine of this case applies to bankruptcy
as well as to equity receivership has been established.72  Nor is there any
doubt that it protects contingent claims such as a landlord's.78
Despite the fact that counsel in the Kuehner case 4 cited the Boyd case in
favor of their contention that the landlords were entitled to come ahead of
stockholders for the full amount of their claims, the Court did not even men-
tion it.75 The Kuehner case is not a square holding that this doctrine has no
application to corporate reorganization proceedings under 77B, as was baldly
stated in Downton Investment Ass'n. v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs.,76 but it
does seem to decide that where other provisions for the claim are made, which
the court deems "reasonable", the doctrine will not be applied to invalidate the
mandate of a statute. Of course, the crux of the issue is the meaning of the
term "reasonable". Does not the Boyd case itself lay down a standard of
protection for the creditor, anything less than which is unreasonable? A
"In re Metropolitan Chain Stores, supra note 17; In re Marshall's Garage, supra
note 59; Trust Co. of Ga. v. Whitehall Holding Co., 53 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. 5th
1931); cf. In. re F. & W. Grand 5-10-25 Cent Stores, 74 F. (2d) 45 (C. C. A. 2d
1934); cf. In re Schulte-United, Inc., 2 Fed. Supp. 285 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
"°But see limitations, supra, at notes 13 'through 17. And note the possibility, ofjudicial construction of the lease so as to make sums payable for repairs "additional
rent" and therefore subject to the rules regarding rent. In re United Cigar Stores(Picker), supra note 22.
7Northern Pacific Ry. & R.R. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554 (1912). See(1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1003 for a complete analysis.
"Kingston v. American Car and Foundry Co., 55 F. (2d) 132 (C. C. A. 8th 1932).
'Woodbury v. Sparrell Print, 187 Mass. 426, 73 N. E. 547 (1905) ; see Hamer v.
New York Rys. Co., 244 U. S. 266, 37 Sup. Ct. 511 (1917) ; Howard v. Maxwell Motor
Co., Inc., 269 Fed. 292 (S. D. N. Y. 1920), aff'd 275 Fed. 53 (C. C. A. 2d 1921).
"'Supra note 27.
"'See (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 489, 490.
"Supra note 3.
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priori, this would seem to be so, but any criticism of the present state of the
law must be based on the understanding of the two forces at work in a situa-
tion like this. On the one hand, the stockholders must be protected against
complete loss of their investment. The purpose of § 77B was to preserve
businesses as going concerns, where possible, so that eventually every inter-
ested party could be satisfied. On the other hand, creditors, having little
interest in the future status of the business, try to recoup as much of their
loan as possible. It is hard to balance the equities, but, when it comes to
allowance of claims, the landlord-creditor should at least be allowed to claim
all his damages along with other creditors, even at the expense of stockholders
who speculated in the company and should be prepared to take losses. To be
able to prove full damages is by no means to be able to recoup full loss.
Dividends to creditors averaged 5% to 8% between 1928 and 1932. 77 At best
the landlord can recoup little of his actual.damage. To limit him further
encourages the use of court procedure to evade rightful obligations.
The Kuehner case urges many factors as justifying the limitation of the
landlords' claims to three years full rental. An analysis of the decision leaves
much to be desired. The Court first insists on a difference between property
rights and contract rights, saying that the former may not, but the latter
may, be impaired by an exercise of the bankruptcy powers. Criticism of a
distinction thus taken is immediate; it is a conceptional' nicety but unreal.
The line of demarcation between contract rights and property rights is hazy,
if existent at all. The test of whether either of such rights has been im-
paired is the same--the reasonableness of the impairment.78 And differentia-
tion is necessarily misleading.
The Court then urges that, since failures are a product of depressions, and
since during depressions rental values are very low, the amount of damages
claimed by each landlord will be inordinately high. The statement itself
seems to justify the landlord's claim. A.contract is the legal means of shifting
the risk attendant on fluctuation of market. When the lease was made, both
parties bargained for a given result, and estimated the value of the lease-
hold. The very fact that rentals are so depressed at the time of failure is an
eloquent appeal for the landlord. At best, he will get a dividend of 6%, and
should certainly be allowed to make the most of it.
The Court places some weight on the fact that the land is restored to the
landlord. This, it seems, is regarded as a distinguishing characteristic. But
it is true of almost every contract not fully executed on one side-the servant
whose master files a petition, the seller whose buyer becomes bankrupt be-
fore delivery. Both receive something by virtue of the release from the con-
"See (1933) 21 CAL. L. REv. 561, 566.
'See note (1930) 30 COL. L. Rv. 360; Home Bld'g and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1933).
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tract; the one his services, the other his goods. But no limitation is imposed
on their claims. The landlord has lost the benefit of his bargain just as any
other type of creditor; the method of computing damages clearly takes this ele-
ment into account by deducting present rental value from contract price.
It was implicit in the Court's opinion (and emphasized in the respondent's
brief) that the reason for the three year limitation in § 77B was that Congress
evidently thought that the depression would end after that period and the
landlord would have no losses thereafter. Therefore, he should not be allowed
to claim for more than that period. But this ignores the fact that if full dam-
ages were allowed and the difference between the accelerated reserved rental
and the present value of the leasehold were allowed as a claim, the rise in
prices accompanying a cyclic boom would be a necessary factor in estimating
the present value of the leasehold. Such an estimation could not be exact,
but it would be more so than an arbitrary statutory limit.
Finally, the Court finds damages so speculative as to warrant any type of
limitation in the interests of certainty and standardization. It has already
been demonstrated79 that this objection is not valid. Courts have attempted
more difficult problems of valuation. In any case, mere difficulty should, at
mostcbe grounds for refusal by the court to allow the claim. Claims may be
provable but not allowable.8 0 The plaintiff has the burden of providing the
evidence of the value of his claim; failure to do so should affect the amount of
the claim, not its provability.8 '
There remains the difficult problem of estimating the effect of the prior
decisions on the law as it stands today. Will a properly drawn lease, incor-
porating the "ipso facto" clause, enable the landlord to avoid the limitations
on his claim imposed by the new amendments to the Bankruptcy Act? Is
the remedy given to the landlord in the Act exclusive or is it merely designed
to benefit those landlords who would have received nothing under the old
rule? Under the present rulings and decisions, these contentions are both
tenable.8 2 It may be urged in favor of the former position that the same
arguments favoring the restriction in ordinary cases, and upholding its
reasonableness under the circumstances, would lead to the limitations being
imposed on all landlords' rent claims. Mere words in a lease should not allow
the Congressional intent, based on sound discretion, to be thwarted.
On the other hand, it seems that the weightier arguments favor the recog-
nition of the protective lease clauses as valid avoidances of the limitation.
Analytically speaking, the "ipso facto" clause so operates that the landlords'
claim is based not on a rent covenant, but on a personal contract which, like
"Supra note 58.
'1RFmINGTON, BANKRUPTCY §§ 759, 904.
'In re Wesley Corporation, supra note 60.
'See In re United Cigar Stores Co. of America, supra note 61, refusing to answer the
question.
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any other, is fully provable.83 This applies also to the various covenants of
repair which have already been discussed. It would seem that this-doctrine
should also apply to a guaranty of a lease; but a recent decision holds other-
wise8 4 on the ground that any other decision would subject a guarantor in
reorganization to a liability greater than his principal in reorganization. One
is tempted to question the validity of this objection. The case can be limited
to its facts and be construed as having no application to a solvent guarantor.
But even so, it is hard to justify it. A statute designed to give a landlord a
greater remedy where he had none before, should not be construed to lessen
his rights where he has provided himself with an auxiliary and formerly
valid remedy.8 5 The curtailment of the landlord's rights against a lessee in
bankruptcy or reorganization is no reason for the curtailment of his rights
against a guarantor.
Furthermore, the statute by its terms relates only to those cases where the
trustee has rejected,86 or there is a breach of covenant of indemnity, though
there is reason to believe that the courts will construe it liberally.8T Even
if extended to include those cases where the landlord reentered under the
lease, but where their was no rejection or indemnity clause, it would not follow
that the amendments included the situations where the leasehold lapsed by its
own terms without rejection or reentry,88 as is truei of a lease containing an
"ipso facto" clause.
To hold the statutory limitation applicable to claims provable in toto
before the enactment of the statute would, furthermore, upset the maxim of
statutory construction that already existing rights may not be destroyed ex-
cept by express repeal.
The unfortunate refusal by the courts to apply the doctrine of bankruptcy
as anticipatory breach to a lease still has its repercussions. A recent case8 9
held that where the landlord terminated the landlord-tenant relationship by
illegal reentry after the tenant's bankruptcy, but before rejection by the
trustee, he has no provable claim whatsoever in the reorganization proceed-
ings of the guarantor of the lease. Had the tenant's bankruptcy been deemed
an anticipatory breach of the lease, the landlord would have -had no difficulty
in proving his claim.
'Irving Trust Co. v. Perry, supra note 63.
"Hippodrome Bldg. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,.supra note 76.
"Howard v. Maxwell Motor Co., supra note 73; but cf. In re F. & W. Grand 5-10-25
Cent Stores, Inc.,-70 F. (2d) 691 (C. C. A. 2d 1934). Neither of these cases was
cited in the Hippodrome case.
t'Compare Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., supra note 4.
c(1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 489, 491; Hippodrome Bldg. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., supra
note 76. But cf. In re United Cigar Stores of America (Picker), supra note 22.
"But see In re United Cigar Stores (Picker), supra note 22 for construction of
covenant to repair, etc., as part of rent covenant because of agreement to call any
sums payable for repairs "additional rent".
'In re R.K.O., supra note 23.
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The problem of the date from which the three years will run may also
prove troublesome. It has been held that the amendments to the statute
are retroactive so as to allow a claim for rental damages in a bankruptcy
where the effective date of the amendments occurred during the period
for filing claims. 90 The court has also decided that where there is a
rejection by the trustee the date of rejection marks the beginning of the three
year period. 91 The court reasons that if this were not so, the landlord with-
out an indemnity clause might lose his claim altogether. This is no longer
cogent, but the decision will probably stand. It is just, for the date of rejec-
tion marks the time when the landlord regains the power to use his 'property.
In case of reentry without rejection, pursuant to terms of the lease, the date
of reentry will.undoubtedly mark the beginning of the three years.92
A final thought occurs regarding a type of lease which is becoming
more and more prevalent, the percentage lease. By terms of such a lease
the landlord takes either a minimum rental, plus a percentage of the profits
of the shop located on the premises or a flat percentage without minimum. Few
of these leases envisage the bankruptcy situation. How will damages be
estimated? Two methods of dealing with this situation present themselves.
It may be argued that the landlord was taking only the risk of the single shop
when he contracted and should be allowed damages on the basis of expected
profit from the specific shop, figured by means of expert judgment based to
a large extent on past, averages. On the other hand, in the case of a chain
store, it may be argued that the landlord took the risk of insolvency of the
chain as a whole and the consequent closing of the shop when he signed the
lease. In the absence of authority, the latter seems to be the proper inter-
pretation, especially when a minimum rental has been stipulated giving the
landlord some damages in any case.
It is suggested that the statute be amended so as to dearly indicate its scope
and eradicate the harshness of the decision binding landlords to one or three
years full rent as the amount of their claim.
*'In re Winn Shoe Co., Inc., 87 F. (2d) 713 .(C. C. A. 2d 1937).
"In re United Cigar Stores (Picker), supra note 22.
'In re Benguiat, 20 Fed. Supp. 504 (S. D. Cal. 1937).
